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Land Use Takings: The
Compensation Issue
By DANImE R. MANDELKER*

No constitutional problem has proved more contentious in
land use regulation than the taking issue. Courts must draw lines
between land use restrictions that do or do not pass the constitutional property taking test.
Courts that hold land use regulation unconstitutional usually
provide relief by injunction as the appropriate judicial remedy. A
successful landowner in land use litigation is granted an injunction
setting aside the land use restriction that the court has held unconstitutional as applied in his particular case.1 Courts do not provide an alternative remedy based on the taking clause by awarding
compensation to the landowner for an unconstitutional land use
restriction.z
* B.A., 1947, LL.B., 1949, University of Wisconsin; J.S.D., 1956, Yale Law School. Howard A. Stamper Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis.
The author would like to thank Mitchel Kider, third-year law student, Washington
University, who assisted in the research on this article and prepared the footnotes. The
author would also like to thank Professor Susan Appleton, Washington University School of
Law, whose work on judicial remedies in a related field was most helpful. Ronald Levin,
Associate Professor of Law, Washington University, provided valuable guidance on § 1983
problems.
1. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (regulations authorizing public access to what had previously been a private marina found to be a "taking" and
enforcement enjoined); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (regulations
which had the effect of making it commercially impossible to mine certain coal on private
property held unconstitutional and enforcement enjoined). Injunctive relief is available only
in those cases challenging the constitutionality of land use restrictions "as applied" to the
landowner's property. Courts will not enjoin regulations in a facial attack case. See Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. See, e.g., Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. App. 343, 590 P.2d 459 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 38 Colo. App. 44,
554 P.2d 317 (1976); Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Allen v. City & County of Honolulu, 58 Hawaii 432, 571 P.2d 328 (1977); McShane v. City of Faribault,-Minn.-, 292 N.W.2d 253
(1980); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,
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This remedial preference inverts the customary remedial hierarchy typical of private litigation. Equitable relief by injunction in
private litigation is extraordinary. It is available only when relief of
harm through damages is not adequate, and then only if the court
finds that the equities of the case justify the injunctive remedy. In
land use litigation, courts never inquire into the adequacy of monetary relief. They grant injunctions to set aside excessive land use
restrictions without examining the equities.
In recent years, litigants have attempted to restore to land use
litigation the remedial hierarchy characteristic of private lawsuits.
They have urged judicial acceptance of an inverse condemnation
remedy in place of the usual relief through injunction. The inverse
condemnation remedy would allow courts to award compensation
to landowners who successfully challenge restrictive land use
385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d
193 (N.D. 1979).
Inverse condemnation advocates have cited a number of state court cases in support of
their claim that the states have recognized the inverse condemnation remedy in land use
control litigation. See, e.g., Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, SOUTHWEST LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1980 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT
DOMAIN 177, 206-07. The cases cited by Professor Kanner do not support his claim. See, e.g.,
Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979) (compensation
required when city demanded reservation of land for future condemnation for highway purposes); State v. Mayhew Prod. Corp., 204 Neb. 266, 281 N.W.2d 783 (1979) (state statute
required compensation for billboard removal); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389
(Tex. 1978) (rejection of water development permit held to be taking of scenic easement
requiring compensation).
3. For a discussion of the subordinate role played by the injunction in the customary
remedial hierarchy, see 0. FIss, THE CIVL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 38-45 (1978).
4. Inverse condemnation is a monetary remedy sought by landowners alleging a deprivation of property by a public agency without just compensation. It is a private cause of
action invoking the eminent domain clause of the federal or state constitutions. For a general discussion of inverse condemnation, see Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse
Condemnation, 1968 UW. L. ANN. 1; Feder & Wieland, Inverse Condemnation-A Viable
Alternative, 51 DEN. L.J. 529 (1974); Huxtable, Inverse Condemnation-ItsStructures,Advantages,and Pitfalls, SOUTHWEST LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1977 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING
AND EMINENT DOMAIN 219; Stubbs, Inverse Eminent Domain Resulting from Governmental
Action, SOUTHWEST LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1979 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT
DOMAIN 437; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1971); Note, Inverse Condemnation: The Case
for Diminution in Property Value as Compensable Damage, 28 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1976);
Note, Inverse Condemnation:Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974); Comment, "Takings" Under the Police Power-The
Development of Inverse Condemnation as a Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances,30
Sw. L.J. 723 (1976); Comment, Limiting the Availability of Inverse Condemnation as a
Landowner's Remedy for Downzoning, 13 URB. L. ANN. 263 (1977).
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regulations.
The latest round of litigation to secure compensation for landowners affected by unconstitutional land use regulation was inconclusive. In Agins v. City of Tiburon,5 the United States Supreme
Court affirmed a California Supreme Court decision' denying compensation to landowners restricted by low density zoning enacted
to implement a comprehensive open space plan. Agins had reached
the California Supreme Court without a trial, the owners having
appealed a trial court decision to dismiss their complaint. The case
was an attack on the facial validity of the ordinance. The constitutionality of the ordinance had yet to be tested as applied to the
Agins' land.
While the California Supreme Court found on the merits that
compensation was not allowable in California as a remedy in land
use litigation, the United States Supreme Court did not reach this
issue. It noted that the land use ordinance applicable to the Agins'
property allowed a density of between one and five units per acre.
Since the Agins' had not asked the city to determine what density
it would permit, the Court concluded that they had not demonstrated a restriction on their land sufficient to constitute a taking.
On this basis, it affirmed the decision of the California Supreme
Court.7
Another California case, San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v.
City of San Diego8 was working its way through the judicial system
at the same time as Agins. San Diego was not an appeal on the
pleadings. A trial court had awarded compensation to the gas company following a trial in which it found that excessively restrictive
5. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
6. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
7. 447 U.S. at 263. The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court was quite different from that of the California Supreme Court. After holding that inverse condemnation
is not available as a remedy in zoning cases, the California Supreme Court denied injunctive
relief, holding that mere diminution in market value is not sufficient to constitute a taking.
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378 (1979).
The United States Supreme Court denied relief because plaintiffs did not exhaust their
administrative options and so were unable to demonstrate a restriction sufficient to constitute a taking. 447 U.S. at 262. In light of this difference, and because the United States
Supreme Court did not decide whether inverse condemnation is an available remedy in zoning cases, a remand for a determination consistent with its opinion would have been more
appropriate.
8. 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (App. 1978), rev'd on remand without published opinion, 4 Civ.
No. 16277 (filed June 25, 1979), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,49 U.S.L.W. 4317 (1981).
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open space zoning constituted a taking. The California Court of
Appeal affirmed, 9 but the California Supreme Court remanded for
reconsideration in light of its decision in Agins.10 The court of appeal then reversed its decision on the compensation award."' The
United States Supreme Court dismissed the case for the same rea12
sons given in Agins.
The compensation issue in land use regulation thus continues
to trouble courts asked to recognize compensation claims as well as
legislatures asked to provide a compensation remedy.1 3 This article
9. Id. See also Memorandum from Chris Duerken, The Conservation Foundation
(July 7, 1980); Brief for Appellants at 10 n.5, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
10. The decision was summarily vacated by the California Supreme Court and remanded to the court of appeal. Brief for Appellants at 10 n.5, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
11. Id. The court of appeal's reversal is contained in an unpublished decision.
12. 49 U.S.L.W. 4317 (1981). The dissenting opinion stated that compensation for a
permanent taking was not allowable but indicated that compensation should be available for
a temporary taking.
"The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court finds that a police power
regulation has effected a 'taking,' the government entity must pay just compensation for the
period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the
date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation....
Should the government decide immediately to revoke or otherwise amend the regulation, it
would be liable for payment of compensation only for the interim during which the regulation effected a 'taking.'. . . Alternatively the government may choose formally to condemn
the property, or otherwise to continue the offending regulation: in either case the action
must be sustained by proper measures of just compensation." 49 U.S.L.W. at 4327 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist indicated that "[i]f I were satisfied, that this appeal was from a 'final judgment or decree' . . ., I would have little difficulty in agreeing
with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of JusTicE BRENNAN." Id. at 4320.

See Professor Cunningham's article in this symposium for a more complete explication
of the San Diego case. Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory
Takings," 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517 (1981).
13. Florida has provided a statutory inverse condemnation remedy applicable to selected state environmental regulation. The statute is modeled on a provision contained in
AmimcAN LAW INsTrrTT,

MODzL LAND Dzvmopmz

rr CODE § 9-112 (1976). For a careful

analysis of the Florida law, see Kolis, The Taking Issue: FloridaLaw Authorizes Compensation for "Unreasonable" Takings by State Environmental Agencies, 38 UES. LAND No. 3,
at 14 (1979). The statute applies only if a trial court finds an "unreasonable exercise of the
state's police power constituting a taking without compensation." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 380.85 (West Supp. 1980). See also Haisler & Rhodes, The Legislature'sRole in the Taking Issue, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 1 (1976).
The arguments against inverse condemnation apply as persuasively to a legislative remedy, even though the legislature can spell out the limits of the remedy and avoid the uncertainties of court-imposed compensation. The Florida legislation does not attempt to indicate
when the remedy lies, since under the statute the availability of compensation depends on a
court finding that a "taking without compensation" has occurred.

Spring 1981]

LAND USE SYMPOSIUM

examines the compensation issue. It argues that advocates who
support the compensation claim have misconceived the role of the
compensation remedy. There has never been an absolute right to
compensation, even in cases in which an interference with property
rights sufficient to constitute a taking is clear. Whether compensation is payable for excessive land use restrictions raises a remedial
question which courts retain the discretion to resolve. They are not
likely to provide compensation to landowners, even in cases in
which an unconstitutional property taking occurs.
I.

The Nature of the Inverse Condemnation
Remedy

Federal and state constitutions require public agencies to pay
compensation for land they have physically occupied for public
purposes. 14 An example is the physical occupation of private property by a state highway agency to build a road. A compensation
remedy is clearly available in these cases. What of the case in
which a public agency elects not to occupy the land of a property
owner physically, but carries out a public project that physically
interferes with private property rights? Is the property owner in
this situation left without a compensation remedy?
Federal and state courts have thought not. Beginning with the
United States Supreme Court case Pumpelly v. Green Bay, 8
courts have awarded compensation to property owners when a
public agency has engaged in conduct physically damaging to the
landowner's property but has not voluntarily initiated eminent domain proceedings. The action in inverse-or reverse-condemnation allows the court to assess against the public agency the compensation it should have made available to the landowner in
eminent domain proceedings of its own.
The facts in Pumpelly indicate the kind of physical damage to
14. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This
provision is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CoNST.
amend. XIV. State constitutions have similar provisions, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19: "Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation ... has
first been paid .... "
15. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). For a discussion and analysis of this case, see
Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility,
1966 Wis. L. Rzv. 3, 4043.
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property that grounds an inverse condemnation action. In that
case, plaintiffs land was flooded when the city constructed a public
dam near his property. Plaintiff sued and recovered in inverse condemnation for the damage to his property interest. Since
Pumpelly, the inverse condemnation cause of action for physical
damage to property has become well established in federal and
state courts.16
While well established, the right to compensation in inverse
condemnation actions is not absolute. The physical damage cases
do not trouble the courts, provided that a link can be established
between the physical damage and the government activity claimed
to be responsible for the damage. In these cases, specific relief
through injunction will not remedy the plaintiff's harm. Property
damage has occurred and cannot be remedied except through monetary damages that compensate for the harm to the property
owner.
Compensation awards in inverse condemnation-physical damage cases do not reflect unquestioning judicial acceptance of the
remedial hierarchy observed in private litigation. That point is
made by inverse condemnation cases arising out of continuing as
well as past physical damage. An important example is found in
the cases in which property owners have successfully asserted inverse condemnation claims when airplane overflights have interfered with the use of their property.18 While the courts can award
monetary compensation to remedy past damage in these cases,
only an injunction can provide the necessary prospective relief
from continuing airplane overflights. Such remedial relief by injunction would be consistent with the private lawsuit remedial
hierarchy.
16. For a discussion of these cases, see Mandelker, supra note 15; Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1969).
17.

See, e.g., Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal.

Rptr. 89 (1965). In the course of extending a county road, Los Angeles County deposited
earth fills in a prehistoric landslide area. A geological study found that the land had stabilized, and future slides were not expected. A major landslide then occurred, causing substantial damage to private property. Although finding no negligence on the part of the county,
the California Supreme Court awarded damages in inverse condemnation. The court held
that "any actual physical injury to real property proximately caused by the improvement as
deliberately designed and constructed is compensable.. . whether forseeable or not." Id. at
263-64, 398 P.2d at 137, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 97.

18.

See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328

U.S. 256 (1946).
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Courts do not provide relief by injunction in the overflight
cases for an obvious reason: they are not willing to close down major airports simply to avoid property damage to affected property
owners. The private remedial hierarchy is therefore reversed.
Courts award monetary relief through inverse condemnation in the
airplane overflight cases because they have decided that relief by
injunction does not serve social interests. As the Oregon Supreme
Court pointed out in awarding compensation in such a case,
"[i]nverse condemnation .. .provides the remedy where an injunction would not be in the public interest, and where the continued interference amounts to a taking for which the constitution
demands a remedy." 19
This explanation of the inverse condemnation award in airplane overflight cases indicates that the remedial hierarchy characteristic of private lawsuits does not control inverse condemnation
litigation. Courts refuse relief by injunction even when the inadequacy of monetary damages might indicate that injunctive relief is
necessary.20
There is reason to believe that the courts also disregard the
private remedial hierarchy in land use regulation cases, a point
which will be discussed later. Here the point should be made that
19. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 191-92, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (1962). The
rejection of the remedial hierarchy implicit in Thornburg and the underlying policy rationale for relief by inverse condemnation is clear in cases that deny the inverse remedy for
policy reasons. In Northcutt v. State Road Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968),
property owners sued in inverse condemnation for damage caused by vibration and noise
from a nearby interstate highway. In denying relief, the court distinguished this type of case
from the airplane overflight cases: "An airport may be placed at a considerable distance
from a city while it is a public necessity for roads and highways to be built close to, or
directly through a city, and sometimes through its most heavily populated areas. To sustain
the amended complaint of the plaintiffs as sufficient for inverse condemnation would bring
to an effective halt the construction, operation and maintenance of access roads and highways within the State of Florida. It would be impossible to determine and prepare with any
degree of accuracy, a reasonable budget for the construction of highways and access roads in
the future in Florida. After the access roads and highways were constructed and in operation, each individual land owner adjacent thereto could seek damages from the state for a
'taking' of their property resulting from the increased noises, dust and vibrations, coming
from the motor vehicles using the adjacent highway." Id. at 711.
For discussion see Comment, The Highway Cases: Noise as a Taking or Damaging of
Property in California,20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 425 (1980).
20. At least one court took this position in a private nuisance case. See Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). See also
McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1980) (court awarded damages in § 1983 action
when relief by injunction deemed inadequate).

V1
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the remedial assumptions courts make in inverse condemnation
cases contradict the claims made by advocates of the inverse condemnation remedy for land use litigation.
Inverse condemnation advocates find a symmetry in the remedies available for unconstitutional takings and equate available
remedies without remedial ranking.2 For these advocates, the nature of the land use taking is irrelevant to the inverse condemnation claim. They note that federal and state constitutions require
that property not be taken without just compensation. They next
construct a compensation syllogism based on this constitutional
command that includes taking through land use regulation as well
as conventional physical taking cases:
Any constitutional taking of property requires just compensation.
An excessive land use regulation, like a physical taking, is a constitutional taking of property.
Therefore, an excessive land use regulation requires compensation.
The compensation syllogism ignores the rejection of the private remedial hierarchy in the airplane overflight-inverse condemnation cases. These cases reject the remedial symmetry assumption
implicit in the compensation syllogism that automatically requires
monetary relief whenever a constitutional taking occurs. As the
Oregon Supreme Court pointed out, courts award monetary relief
in inverse condemnation cases only when the remedy by injunction
is not in the public interest.
In Agins, the California Supreme Court also rejected the compensation syllogism. It established a remedial hierarchy in land use
regulation taking cases that prefers the injunctive remedy to avoid
the "chilling effect" that monetary inverse condemnation relief can
have on land use regulation programs.22 The California Agins deci21. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Half Moon Bay Properties in Support of Appellants at 18-19, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), in which amicus argues that"Tiburon has, through its ordinances, effectively compelled the Agins to maintain their land
as 'open space' for the aesthetic pleasure of Tiburon's residents. Had Tiburon instead forcibly seized Agins' property and staked it out as 'open space preserve,' the loss to the
Agins-and the benefit to Tiburon residents-would be no different. Yet the court below
has denied compensation in the first case, although it clearly would be proper in the second.
There is no ground in logic to justify the difference' Nor is there any ground in policy
22. The court concluded that a monetary inverse condemnation remedy "will intimidate legislative bodies and will discourage the implementation of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of measures which are less stringent, more traditional, and fiscally
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sion rejects the remedial hierarchy implicit in private litigation in
which monetary relief is the preferred judicial remedy. The question to be considered next is whether the remedial hierarchy
adopted by the California Supreme Court is justified as a proper
interpretation of the constitutional taking doctrine in land use law.
II.

The Taking Claim in Land Use Law

An answer to the remedial question in land use taking cases
first requires a detour to examine the constitutional basis for the
taking claim that arises in land use regulation. Briefly put, the taking claim arises when land use regulation is so excessive that no
reasonable use of the land remains to the landowner. s In this situation, the compensation advocate argues that a taking has occurred
and that compensation should be paid.
The difficulty with this argument is that land use taking law
now indicates that takings occur only in the most extreme circumstances. In these cases, remedial relief to the landowner through
injunction is sufficient to remedy the harm created by the unconstitutional land use restriction.
The most serious taking problem in land use regulation arises
when the burdens of regulation are physically disconnected from
its benefits. A number of regulatory programs fit this category,
most notably historic landmark, open space, wetlands and flood
plain protection programs. In all of these programs, severe land use
safe." 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (quoting from Hall, Eldridge v.

City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569,
1597 (1977)). Additionally, it would be a usurpation of legislative power for the judiciary to
force condemnation upon a legislature. For these reasons, invalidation rather than forced

compensation is the appropriate remedy. 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
378. See also Northcutt v. State Road Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
23. For general discussion and analysis of the taking claim in land use litigation, see
Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165 (1974); Costonis,

"Fair"Compensationand the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in
Land Use Controversies,75 COLUM. L. Rv.1021 (1975); Large, This Land is Whose Land?

Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L. Rav. 1039; Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationof "Just Compensation"Law,
80 HRv.L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964);
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Van Alstyne,
Taking or Damagingby PolicePower: The Search for Inverse CondemnationCriteria,44 S.
CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1971); Waite, Governmental Power and Private Property,16 CATH. U.L.
Rv.283 (1967); Comment, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Cartato a Just Formulation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv.904 (1976).
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restrictions are often imposed on property owners so that the general public can enjoy the benefits of the protected resource.2 4 A
municipality, for example, may prevent the demolition of an historic landmark so that the general public can enjoy the benefits of
the preserved historic structure. The preservation of open space
and other natual resource areas may also require severe land use
restrictions so that the benefits of these areas can be widely
enjoyed.
Recent trends in United States Supreme Court land use law
indicate that this Court will rarely find a constitutional taking of
property under land use programs of this type. The constitutional
issues raised by these cases were first considered by the Supreme
Court in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City.2 5 In
a puzzling opinion, the Court held constitutional the Grand Central Terminal landmark designation which the city applied to prohibit the construction of a high-rise building that would have used
the terminal's air rights.
While the Court in Penn Central wavered between the taking,
equal protection" and due process doctrines, 7 its holding on the
24. Several commentators have argued that a harm-benefit test should be applied to
determine the constitutionality of these restrictive police power regulations. Under this test,
government regulation enacted to bestow a benefit upon the community is unconstitutional
A land use regulaiion is constitutional only when its purpose is to prevent a harmful activity. For a discussion and critique of this approach, see Berger, supra note 23, at 172-75.
The harm-benefit test is no longer applied in land use taking cases. See notes 25-33 and
accompanying text infra. See also D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQurrY ch. 4 (1981).
25. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
26. Plaintiffs had argued that, unlike historic preservation and zoning legislation,
landmark laws are discriminatory because they arbitrarily single out an individual parcel of
land for less favorable treatment. Id. at 131-132. Adopting an equal protection standard, the
Court relied on comprehensive planning to rebut the spot zoning argument: "It is true, as
appellants emphasize, that both historic-district legislation and zoning laws regulate all
properties within given physical communities whereas landmark laws apply only to selected
parcels. But, contrary to appellants' suggestions, landmark laws are not like discriminatory,
or 'reverse spot,' zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular
parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones ....
In contrast to
discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part of some comprehensive plan, the New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures
of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city, and as noted, over
400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been designated pursuant to this plan." Id. at
132.
27. The Court recognized historic preservation as a legitimate zoning purpose. Id. at
129. See Marcus, The Grand Slam Central Terminal Decision: A Euclid for Landrarks,
FavorableNotice for TDR and a Resolution of the Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 731 (1979).
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burden and benefit issue is of special interest. Though its opinion
on this point is unclear, the Court appeared to hold that the burden of the landmark restriction on the terminal owners was justified by the benefits of landmark preservation
enjoyed-by the entire
28
city, which the terminal owners shared.
Agins presented a similar burden and benefit problem. In that
case, the city implemented an open space designation in its open
space plan2" by adopting a low density zoning ordinance limiting
the Agins' property to a density of one to five dwelling units per
acre. Language used by the Supreme Court indicated that the burden of the low density restriction was justified by the communitywide benefits which the low density, open space zoning conferred.30
This relaxed attitude toward the benefit-burden problem, and
the Court's willingness to uphold the objectives of historic preservation and open space regulation, suggest that most land use regulation will not raise a taking problem in federal court.3 1 State
courts are equally sympathetic to land use regulation that imposes
restrictive regulations to confer diffuse public benefits. While the
constitutionality of landmark preservation is not fully established
at the state level,32 recent state cases have unanimously upheld
28. 438 U.S. at 134-38.
29. California cities like Tiburon must prepare an open space plan. CAL. GoV'T CODE
§ 65563 (West 1980). The open space plan is one element in a local comprehensive plan
which California municipalities are required to prepare and adopt. See generally
Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MIcH.
L. REv. 899 (1976). Tiburon's enactment of the restrictions on the Agins' property to implement a comprehensive planning program weakens the argument that the Agins' property
was singled out for a "taking."
30. "The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public by serving the
city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential property with provision for open-space areas. There is no indication that the appellants' five-acre tract is the
only property affected by the ordinances. Appellants therefore will share with other owners
the benefits and burdens of the city's exercise of its police power. In assessing the fairness of
the zoning ordinance, these benefits must be considered along with any diminution in market value that the appellants might suffer." 447 U.S. at 262.
31. See, e.g., Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting equal
protection and taking objections to local land use regulation)..
32. Compare Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (court struck down
landmarks preservation of private parks and mandatory TDR program) with Mayor of
Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 316 A.2d 807 (1974) (court upheld refusal
to permit demolition of historic church). For a general discussion of the constitutionality of
landmark preservation, see S. RoHAN, ZONMN AND LAND Usa CONTROLS ch. 7 (1978); Gerstell, Needed: A Landmark Decision,8 Una. LAw. 213 (1976).
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flood plain and wetlands regulation. 3 A recent New Jersey lower
court decision, that the environmental purpose of natural resource
regulation justifies restrictive regulatory burdens on property, may
34
well summarize the trend of the law.
One other aspect of the Agins decision deserves comment for
its bearing on the taking doctrine. Recall that the property owners
in Agins challenged the ordinance as an unconstitutional taking on
its face. They made no attempt to secure a building permit under
the ordinance or to press the city to allow them the highest residential density permissible under the ordinance.3 5 This failure to
exhaust remedies is often fatal to plaintiffs' claims in state
courts.36 These courts are understandably reluctant to consider
33. See Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. State, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977)
(flood plain legislation upheld); Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Environmental Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975) (wetlands regulations upheld; landowner not
deprived of all reasonable use of land); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Township of Dedham, 362
Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973) (flood plain ordinance
prohibiting residences and commercial uses upheld); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (absolute
prohibition of dredging and filling wetlands upheld); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d
239 (1975) (wetlands regulations upheld as valid police power measure to prevent future
activities that would be harmful to the public); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972) (wetlands legislation requiring a conditional use permit to fill land
upheld).
34. In Usdin v. State, 173 N.J. Super, 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980), landowners alleged
that the designation of their land as a floodway for a four year period constituted an unconstitutional taking of property. The court stated that "if the purpose of the restriction [of the
land use] was to prevent an abuse and the restrictions are reasonably related to that end,
the act of restricting is a proper exercise of police power." Id. at 320, 414 A.2d at 289. While
this statement is merely dictum because the court found no taking on other grounds, it
appears to reflect recent trends in the law.
35. Plaintiffs argued that a landowner cannot get effective relief through administrative mandamus proceedings in California. They based this conclusion on Selby Realty Co. v.
City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973), in which
the California Supreme Court held that the city may change the challenged regulation, even
after trial commences, thereby forcing plaintiffs to start over again. Brief for Appellants at
28, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Plaintiffs further argued that it would be
futile to require them to seek the highest residential density permissible and then challenge
the zoning in an administrative mandamus proceeding because California governmental
bodies can simply ignore a landowner's application. Plaintiffs contended that mandamus
proceedings would be totally ineffective in such a situation. Id. at 29.
36. See Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 422 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1979), in
which the New York Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's finding that regulations
preventing mining on wetlands property constituted a taking. The decision was reversed
because there was no proof of an unreasonable restriction. There was no trial or hearing on
the taking question, and the only evidence on the record was plaintiff's testimony that no
activity other than the proposed mining would afford a reasonable return on the property.
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constitutional issues until the plaintiff has exhausted all available
administrative possibilities to .avoid an unconstitutional land use
restriction.
When Agins reached the Supreme Court, it borrowed from the
exhaustion principle to avoid facing the inverse condemnation issue.37 State courts base the exhaustion principle on the availability
of a zoning remedy, such as a zoning variance, which can remove a
potentially unconstitutional zoning restriction from a tract of land.
In Agins, the Supreme Court decided it could not reach the inverse
condemnation issue because the Agins' had not applied for a building permit to discover what density the city would allow. The
Court required "exhaustion" in the sense that it required the property owners to test the constitutional extent of the regulatory burden on their property.
Taken together, Penn Central, 2Agins and their analogous
state cases severely restrict the scope of the taking challenge to
land use regulation. The Supreme Court has accepted regulatory
purposes that impose restrictive land use burdens, has refused to
entertain facial attacks on land use regulations, and has indicated
that even harsh land use restrictions can be justified by widely distributed community benefits.38
Id. at 264, 397 N.E.2d at 1308, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 641. To sustain his burden of proof, "the
landowner should produce 'dollars and cents' evidence as to the economic return that could
be realized under each permitted use." Id. at 263, 397 N.E.2d at 1308, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
The court remitted the case to the trial court for a hearing on the taking issue. Id. at 265,
397 N.E.2d at 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
Agins and Spears are similar holdings. Both courts found no taking because there was
no proof of an unreasonable restriction. See note 37 and accompanying text infra. For an
excellent discussion of the exhaustion doctrine in land use cases, see Note, Exhaustion of
Remedies in Zoning Cases, 1964 WAsH. U.L.Q. 368.
37. 447 U.S. at 263. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1975)
(Stevens, J.), modified on othergrounds, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
932 (1978), holding that a constitutional § 1983 claim does not lie when plaintiff has an
adequate state remedy. Bonner was cited with approval in Ingraham v. White, 430 U.S. 651,
679 n.74 (1977)(Powell, J.).
38. Penn Central does leave the taking issue unresolved to some extent. See Note,
Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City: Easy Taking-Clause Cases
Make UncertainLaw, 1980 UTAH L. Rav. 369. The Supreme Court noted that the terminal
was earning a reasonable return, and also noted that no investment backed expectations of
its owners were frustrated. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 124,
136. It is not clear how the Court would decide a case in which investment backed expectations were precluded and the landowners were unable to realize a reasonable return. Note,
supra,at 380. The Court's adoption of Professor Michelman's "fairness" approach may well
mean that it will apply a strict standard of scrutiny when harsh regulations justified by
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This doctrinal totality indicates that a court following the Supreme Court's lead will declare a land use regulation unconstitutional only in an especially harsh and insupportable set of circumstances. The court must be willing to discredit the municipality's
justification for its land use program. It must be willing to believe
that the benefits conferred by the program do not justify the burdens it imposes. Finally, the landowner must have demonstrated
through application to the municipal authority that no constitutionally permissible land use is allowable.
There is no justifiable reason in this factual setting for a court
to accept the compensation syllogism and award monetary relief to
a landowner through the inverse condemnation remedy. The airplane overflight cases indicate that alternative remedies in land use
taking cases are not symmetrical, that there is no absolute remedial hierarchy, and that the order to be assigned in the remedial
hierarchy is determined by the "public interest." Certainly there is
no reason in the fact situation just outlined to confirm the public
interest in the land use regulation at issue by awarding monetary
relief to the landowner. A fact situation in which a municipality
imposes oppressively burdensome land use restrictions for no discernible public purpose cries for corrective relief that will allow the
landowner to proceed with its development plans.
It is true that most state courts will not give specific relief to
successful property owners in land use litigation that will modify a
zoning ordinance to permit them to go forward with their development.39 Most state courts view specific relief of this kind as improper judicial interference with local legislative powers. They will

V

widely distributed benefits upset "distinct investment backed expectations." See
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rzv. 1165 (1967). The Supreme Court's opinion in
Agins also recognized that the appellants' investment backed expectations were not frustrated because the challenged ordinance allowed the construction of some residential units.
447 U.S. at 262.
39. See Hartman, Beyond Invalidation: The JudicialPower to Zone, 9 URB. L. ANN.
159 (1975). The problem of judicial relief in zoning litigation is complicated because a local
legislative action by the governing body is required. The governing body must modify the
zoning ordinance in a manner that will allow the plaintiff's development to proceed if the
developer is to secure adequate redress from a zoning regulation a court has held excessively
restrictive. Some courts now hold that local governing body proceedings to amend zoning
ordinances are administrative. See text accompanying note 55 infra. In these jurisdictions, a
court holding a zoning regulation unconstitutional would normally remand to the local governing body in its administrative capacity for further proceedings necessary to carry out the
court's decision. Monetary relief would normally not be available.
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usually remand to the municipality for appropriate relief "in accordance with the court's opinion." If a municipality resists compliance-an event which sadly occurs all too often-the landowner's
court victory will be frustrated. Advocates for the inverse condemnation remedy in land use litigation often cite the inadequacy of
judicial relief to support their arguments. 0
This argument is misplaced. Modifications in the judicial approach to injunctive relief in land use litigation are more in the
public interest than compensatory relief when public policy does
not justify a land use regulation a court holds to be unconstitutional. Some erosion is already evident in the judicial hesitancy to
compel specific changes in land use regulations, 41 especially in the
40. Appellants and Amicus argued in Agins that injunctive relief is seldom granted by
California courts and, even when granted, it provides inadequate relief for past harm. Brief
for Appellants at 27-28, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Half Moon Bay Properties, Inc., in Support of Appellants at 26-27.
41. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. City of Worthington, - Ohio St. 2d -, 405 N.E.2d 277
(1980), in which the court held that a trial court which invalidates a zoning ordinance
should give notice that the municipality should rezone the property within a reasonable
period of time. Id. at -, 405 N.E.2d at 279-80. The court further stated that, "[i]n the event
the zoning authority either fails to rezone or fails to rezone the property in a constitutionally permissible manner, the court shall examine the reasonableness of the proposed use,
and, upon finding that use to be reasonable, enjoin the city from interfering with it." Id. at
-, 405 N.E.2d at 280. The decision was based on an earlier Michigan Supreme Court case
which held that when a zoning ordinance is declared invalid, the municipal agency has sixty
days to present an amended ordinance "comporting with the dictates of equity as well as
the requirements of constitutional reasonableness as applied to an aggrieved landowner's
parcel." Ed Zaagman, Inc. v. Kentwood, 406 Mich. 137, 181, 277 N.W.2d 475, 483 (1979). If
the court finds the amended ordinance to be unacceptable, it may then grant specific relief.
Id. at 182, 277 N.W.2d at 483. See also Hartman, supra note 39.
In Pennsylvania, the state zoning enabling legislation provides the judiciary with the
power to grant site specific relief to a landowner who has successfully challenged the validity
of a zoning restriction as applied to his property. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (Purdon's Supp. 1980) provides that: "If the court... finds that an ordinance or map or a
decision or order thereunder which has been brought up for review unlawfully prevents or
restricts a development or use which has been described by the landowner through plans
and other materials submitted to the governing body, agency or officer of the municipality
whose action or, failure to act is in question on the appeal, it may order the described development or use approved as to all elements or it may order it approved as to some elements
and refer other elements to the governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction thereof
for further proceedings, including the adoption of alternative restrictions, in accordance
with the court's opinion and order."
This statute has been interpreted to authorize courts to grant site specific relief, but not
the authority to order a rezoning. Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404,
415, 333 A.2d 239, 246 (1975). See Hyson, The Problem of Relief in Developer-Initiated
Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 12 URs. L. ANN. 21, 38-48 (1976).
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exclusionary zoning cases.42 The courts that provide specific relief
to successful litigating developers in exclusionary zoning cases are
aware of the oppressive nature of exclusionary zoning restrictions.
They are also aware of the cost of litigation delays to the developer, and of the frustration that follows a failure to provide
specific judicial relief to eliminate exclusionary restrictions held
unconstitutional. 3 Comparable compelling arguments support the
award of specific judicial relief in cases in which a municipality
adopts environmental or similar land use regulations that impose
unreasonable restrictions on landowners, with no social justification.

III. The Section 1983 Analogy
Additional perspective on the compensation remedy in land
use litigation is provided by a review of land use cases brought
under section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1866.44 Unavailable until recently as the basis for actions against municipalities,4 5 section 1983 now authorizes damage actions against municipalities for violations of "any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws. ' 46 This statute provides a
42. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192
(1977) (court ordered issuance of building permit to successful developer litigant); Berenson
v. Town of Newcastle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979) (same result, though court
struck lower court's determination of appropriate residential density as improper exercise of
judicial power).
43. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 549-51, 371
A.2d 1192, 1226-27 (1977).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1980). Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), established a private monetary action under the Fourteenth Amendment for
deprivation of federally protected rights. Following Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), which established municipal liability under § 1983, the United States
Supreme Court has indicated that a Bivens action under the Fourteenth Amendment might
not be implied when § 1983 is available. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). See Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (Congress did not intend to foreclose alternative remedies
available to persons not protected by the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964).
45. In Monell v. Department of Social Servs. 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the United States
Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision in Monroe v. Pape, 356 U.S. 167 (1961), and
ruled that municipalities and other local governing bodies are "persons" within the meaning
of § 1983 and thus subject to damage claims for constitutional violations.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1980). In Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980), the
Supreme Court held that in addition to providing a cause of action for constitutional violations, § 1983 provides a cause of action for federal statutory violations. Section 1983 does
not provide a cause of action against the state. Quer v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). This
holding protects state land use regulations from attack.
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statutory damage action that parallels the inverse condemnation
remedy for unconstitutional land use takings. Land use regulation
that constitutes a taking violates the federal Constitution and
clearly triggers the statutory section 1983 mongtary remedy. Proponents of the inverse condemnation remedy for unconstitutional
land use regulation support their arguments by noting that a comparable statutory remedy is available under section 1983. Since the
statutory damages remedy is available in any event, they argue
that there is no reason to deny the constitutional inverse condemnation remedy.
A close look at judicial interpretation of section 1983 indicates
that the comparability argument advanced by the inverse condemnation advocates is not supported by the decisions. The damage
remedy provided by section 1983 is not automatically available to
property owners who litigate claims against municipalities. That
section also authorizes injunctive relief. As in the inverse condemnation cases, the federal courts are likely to prefer relief by injunction rather than a monetary award in land use taking cases.47

The recent availability of section 1983 actions against municipalities has not yet allowed the federal courts an extensive opportunity to adjudicate these cases, but one federal district court has
indicated the likely judicial position on remedial relief in an important land use decision. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) is a major regional planning agency formed by interstate
compact between California and Nevada to protect the area surrounding Lake Tahoe, which has an especially attractive natural
setting. When TRPA enacted an ordinance that substantially restricted the market value of a tract of property by reclassifying it
from residential to "general forest" and "recreation" uses, its
owners brought suit under section 1983 against the TRPA and
members of its governing body. The case reached the United
States Supreme Court, which held that the complaint stated a
claim for relief under section 1983.' e
47. Note that the Eleventl Amendment requires injunctive rather than monetary relief in suits brought against a state. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
48. Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979). The Supreme Court took the case on certiorari to decide whether the TRPA as an
interstate compact agency was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and whether the
individual members of the agency's governing body were entitled to absolute immunity from
federal damage claims. It found that the TRPA was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, but that the agency's members were entitled to absolute immunity when they
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On remand, in Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,4 the federal district court held that plaintiffs in section
1983 actions are not necessarily entitled to damages as the appropriate remedy. In dismissing the case, the court held that public
policy dictates a denial of monetary relief when an injunction and
declaratory relief can provide an adequate alternative remedy.50
Like the California Supreme Court in Agins, the court in Jacobson
noted that to provide monetary relief in land use actions could
have a chilling effect on local land use regulation.5 1 A damage remedy would "inhibit the exercise of the police power," and "frustrate the budgeting of public funds." 52 "Invalidation, rather than
forced compensation, would seem to be the more expedient means
of remedying legislative excesses."5 3 As most courts do in land use
taking cases, Jacobson inverted the usual remedial hierarchy to
hold that relief through injunction, not damages, is the preferred
judicial remedy.
The judicial preference for relief by injunction is also apparent
in section 1983 cases raising other constitutional objections. One of
these other constitutional objections is based on the procedural
due process clause of the federal Constitution. Plaintiffs in section
1983 land use cases are likely to raise procedural due process objections because objections based on the taking or other substantive constitutional clauses will probably not be successful. The procedural due process claim raises problems likely to become
increasingly critical as litigants begin to invoke section 1983 to assert constitutional rights in the land use regulation process.
Land use regulation decisions most likely to raise due process
problems are usually made in the local legislative process. The legacted in a legislative capacity.
49. 474 F. Supp. 901 (D. Nev. 1979).
50. Id. at 902-04. The court denied injunctive relief and dismissed the case because
plaintiffs did not own the property in question when the suit was commenced. Id. at 904.
51. Id. at 903-04. The court adopted the reasoning in Agins that inverse condemnation
would have detrimental effects on the distribution of public funds and so inhibit legislative
action. See note'22 and accompanying text supra.
52. 474 F. Supp. at 903.
53. Id. at 903-04 (quoting from Comment, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in
Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1450 (1974)). Accord, in a § 1983 action, Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 35 (1st
Cir. 1980): "Our research has disclosed no case in which a federal court has ordered a state
or local government unit to pay for a diminution of the value of a piece of property caused
by a zoning regulation."
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islative zoning action that prompted the taking claim in Agins is
one example. While most state courts hold that the zoning procedures used in the local legislative process need not meet constitutional due process criteria," some state courts have taken a contrary position. 5
Whether these state court cases imposing procedural due process obligations on the local legislative zoning process are based on
statutory or constitutional command is not clear. What is clear is
that comparable constitutional objections to legislative zoning procedures may be made in federal section 1983 actions. 56 When made
in federal court, procedural due process objections must be based
on federal rather than state constitutional requirements.5 I These
requirements could provide procedural protection in the legislative
zoning process comparable to the procedural protection provided
by some state courts. 58
54. See Mueller v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 575, 435 P.2d 478 (1967); City of Miami
Beach v. Schauer, 104 So. 2d 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), cert. dismissed, 112 So. 2d 838
(Fla. 1959); Rutland Environmental Protection Ass'n v. Kane County, 31 I. App. 3d 82, 334
N.E.2d 215 (1975); Bryant v. Lake County Trust Co., 166 Ind. App. 92, 334 N.E.2d 730
(1975); Puryear v. City of Greenville, 432 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1968); Crall v. City of Leominster, 362 Mass. 95, 284 N.E.2d 610 (1972); Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 6
N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959); Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, i3
Ohio St. 2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968); O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782 (Okla. 1969).
55. These states hold that the local legislative process is quasi-judicial. See Snyder v.
City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975); Acierno v. Folsom, 337 A.2d 309 (Del.
1975); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (1956); Fasano v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Horn v. Township of Hilltown,
461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327
(1972).
56. Section 1983 encompasses all constitutional violations. See text accompanying
note 46 supra.
57. Federal courts apply federal constitutional principles in cases litigated under
§ 1983. See S. NAHMOD, Crvm RIGHTS & CiuL LiBFRTixs LITIGATION 59-95 (1979).
58. Federal procedural due process law has been developed in cases in which government action has deprived the person invoking due process protection of an "entitlement"
made available by a public agency. See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 444
U.S. 819 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (disability benefits); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare assistance). In its recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has applied a balancing test that considers the nature of the private interest,
the risk of an erroneous decision under the procedures used, the value of additional procedural safeguards, and the additional fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedural safeguards would impose on public agencies. For discussion, see Note, Specifying
the ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing,
88 HARv. L. REv. 1510 (1975); Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427,
1504-28 (1978). See United Land Corp. of America v. Clarke, 613 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1980),
holding that the plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in an application for
local erosion permit sufficient to ground a procedural due process objection arising out of
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The opportunity to make constitutional procedural due process objections to local zoning actions in section 1983 cases opens
up new possibilities for landowners claiming monetary relief. How
the federal courts might react to monetary section 1983 claims
based on procedural due process violations in land use cases is indicated by Carey v. Piphus,59 a United States Supreme Court decision. In Carey, plaintiffs were elementary and secondary school
students who were suspended, without procedural due process, for
infractions of school rules.60 The procedural due process violation
was admitted, but it was not clear whether the suspensions would
have occurred even if proper procedures had been followed.
Plaintiffs brought section 1983 actions based on the procedural due process violations, asking for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as actual and punitive damages. Both students were
reinstated during the pendency of the judicial proceedings after
relatively short periods of time. In one case, the student was
readmitted under a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs' demands for monetary relief turned on the damage flowing from the
procedural due process violation rather than the harm inflicted by
the temporary suspensions. They claimed that constitutional rights
are valuable in themselves, that deterrence of constitutional violations is necessary, and that "every deprivation of procedural due
process may be presumed to cause some injury." 61
Plaintiffs also claimed that compensatory damages should be
awarded even though the suspensions were jusitified. The procedural due process clause was intended to guarantee "the feeling of
just treatment. '62 The "deprivation of protected interests without
procedural due process, even where the premise for the deprivation
is not onerous, inevitably arouses strong feelings of mental and
the local government's denial of the application.
59. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
60. Both students were suspended without a hearing. Piphus was accused of smoking
marihuana in school. Prior to the suspension, a meeting was held between school officials,
Piphus and his mother. The purpose of the meeting was not to determine whether he had
been smoking, but to explain the purpose of the suspension. Id. at 249. Respondent Brisco
was suspended after refusing to remove an earring he was wearing. There was no hearing,
but his mother was previously warned that her son would be suspended if he did not remove
the earring. Id. at 250. Both plaintiffs were readmitted to school shortly after they filed suit.
Id. at 250, 251.
61. Id. at 254 (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 261 (quoting from Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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emotional distress in the individual who is denied the feeling of
just treatment."6
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, disagreed. Powell rejected the contention that "damages should be
presumed to flow from every deprivation of procedural due process. '"" Damages would be available if mental and emotional distress could actually be proved. Powell then held that plaintiffs
were only entitled to nominal damages.
Carey is colored by the personal nature of the claimed injury
to plaintiffs and the obvious analogy to tort law. 5 The case and its
holding are still capable of application to the land use regulation
process, even though property rather than personal interests are
affected.'6 The "feeling of just treatment" justification for procedural due process protection is as applicable to the land use regulation process as it is to school suspensions.6 7 As one leading commentator has noted, one of the major purposes of the taking clause
is to prevent the feeling of unjust deprivation that would prevail
should property regulation surpass the limits of the socially tolerable.6 8 Feelings of unjust deprivation in land use regulation can oc63. 435 U.S. at 261.
64. Id. at 263.
65. Justice Powell's opinion explicitly recognizes that injuries resulting from a deprivation of procedural due process are analogous to injuries resulting from a common law tort.
He held that the common law of torts provided guidelines for damage awards under § 1983.
Id. at 258. Courts should not presume that damages flow from the alleged violation of personal rights; the burden of proving injury is upon the plaintiff. Id. at 262. Damages will only
be awarded if actual injury is sustained. Id. at 254. Since the plaintiffs in Carey were unable
to prove any actual injury, the court found that they were entitled to no more than nominal
damages. Id. For an excellent discussion of the tort analogy applied by the Court see, Note,

Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93
HAnv. L. Rav. 966 (1980).
A similar tort analogy has been applied by courts in physical damage-inverse condemnation cases. See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public
Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3, 13-18.

66. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1971), applied § 1983 to property
damage claims. For a case following Carey and awarding nominal damages for a procedural

violation in a land use case, see McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1980).
67. An example is the "appearance of fairness" doctrine adopted by the Washington
Supreme Court, which requires adherence to minumum procedural safeguards in zoning
matters. See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); Chrobuck v.
Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971). See generally Sullivan, Araby
Revisited: The Evolving Concept of ProceduralDue Process Before Land Use Regulatory
Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 50 (1974).
68. Micheliman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1165, 1208-15 (1967).

512

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol 8:491

cur as well from a failure to observe procedural requirements, even
though the result might not have differed had procedural requirements been observed.
Powell's opinion, immersed as it is in the tort analogies raised
by plaintiffs' claims, fails to address the problem of monetary relief
under section 1983 for procedural due process violations in a larger
context. Powell does state, in important dictum, that "rules governing compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interest protected by
the particular right in question." 69 He might have enlarged this observation by pointing out that the usual judicial remedy in procedural due process violation cases is a remand to the decisionmaking agency for new proceedings in accordance with due process
dictates.70 Powell might not have considered this course of action
in Carey because the plaintiffs were, in fact, reinstated.
Carey closes the circle on monetary relief claims in land use
actions under section 1983. Jacobson holds that an injunction is
the preferred remedy when a taking is found. When the only constitutional violation is procedural, Carey indicates that the procedural violation does not warrant a monetary damage award when
no actual damage is shown.

IV. Federal Abstention Doctrine
This discussion of federal section 1983 actions suggests another reason why the demand for an inverse condemnation remedy
may not succeed in federal litigation. The reason lies in principles
of judicial restraint that limit federal court intervention in matters
of state and local competence, such as land use regulation.7 1 This
self-imposed limitation on federal jurisdiction is important because
plaintiffs are likely to seek a federal forum for inverse condemnation land use actions.
69.

435 U.S. at 259.

70. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv.
1133, 1227-50 (1977).
71. For an elaboration of this argument, see Sager, Questions I Wish I Had Never

Asked: The Burger Court in Exclusionary Zoning, 11 Sw.U.L. Rav. 509, 512-23 (1979). See
also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975); Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway

Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Federal enforcement of the inverse condemnation
remedy would be a singularly inappropriate intrusion into the states' traditional domains of
property law and land use policy.").

Spring 1981]

LAND USE SYMPOSIUM

Note that the United States Supreme Court in Agins could
not have made a binding interpretation of the California state constitution that would have compelled California courts to recognize
the inverse condemnation remedy. A Supreme Court holding that
inverse condemnation lies in land use taking cases would only bind
federal courts as an interpretation of the federal Constitution.
Faced with the reluctance of state courts to entertain inverse condemnation land use taking actions, plaintiffs would most likely
seek inverse condemnation relief in federal courts should the
United States Supreme Court recognize this remedy.12
In federal courts, plaintiffs in inverse condemnation actions
face a limitation on federal jurisdiction-the federal abstention
doctrine W--that reflects federal court reluctance to interfere in
state and local concerns. The federal abstention doctrine also applies to land use inverse condemnation actions brought under section 1983.""
The doctrine of federal abstention developed as a method
through which federal courts could avoid accepting state law cases
when a state law decision might avoid the necessity to consider a
federal question.7 5 Initially, federal courts limited federal abstention to cases in which state law was unsettled. 7 Later, the federal
courts extended the federal abstention doctrine to additional categories. One of these categories, especially applicable in land use litigation, calls for federal court abstention when necessary to allow a
72. State courts hostile to the inverse condemnation remedy would likely find a way
around it, even though plaintiffs sued on the federal constitution. A state court could dismiss an inverse condemnation by applying the exhaustion doctrine, or by holding that no
taking had occurred. See note 7 supra.
73. For a discussion of the federal abstention doctrine and its applicability to inverse
condemnation land use cases, see Harris, Applicationof the Abstention Doctrine to Inverse
Condemnation Actions in Federal Court, 4 PsPPEDIN L. Rav. 1 (1977); Note, Land Use
Regulation, the Federal Courts and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134 (1980).
74. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LmERTiEs LITIGATION 157-60 (1979).
75. See Field, Abstention in ConstitutionalCases: The Scope of the PullmanAbstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. Ray. 1071 (1974); Harrs, Application of the Abstention Doctrine to Inverse Condemnation Actions in Federal Court, 4 PPPERD nE L. Rsv. 1 (1977);
Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts and the Abstention Doctrine,89 YALX L.J.
1134 (1980); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HAv. L. Rv.
1133 (1977).
76. See, e.g., Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Supreme Court held that
federal abstention is warranted when the controversy raises an unclear issue of state law,
and there is a possibility that state adjudication of that issue could avoid the necessity of
reaching the federal question. Under this doctrine, the federal court does not dismiss the
case, but retains jurisdiction over the federal issues. Harris, supra note 75, at 9.
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state to work out questions of state policy."7 Since land use planning and zoning regulations address problems that concern the
state or municipality for which they are enacted, federal courts can
apply the abstention doctrine to decline jurisdiction over land use
litigation. While the United States Supreme Court has not yet considered the federal abstention doctrine in land use taking cases,
several lower federal courts have applied federal abstention to decline jurisdiction in cases of this type.78
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Sederquist v.
City of Tiburon7 9 is typical of federal court decisions applying the
federal abstention doctrine to decline court challenges to local land
use regulation. In Sederquist, the city adopted a temporary moratorium on all development in an area including plaintiffs' property,
and subsequently zoned as open space the road over which plaintiffs claimed an easement of access. Plaintiffs alleged that these
acts constituted a taking for which compensation was required.
The court invoked the federal abstention doctrine, recognizing that
land use regulation is a sensitive area of state and local policy. 0
Quoting from an earlier Ninth Circuit case, the court stated that
"[flederal courts must be wary of intervention that will stifle inno'
vative state efforts to find solutions to complex social problems."81
The court also reasoned that a state court determination of appli77. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). The Supreme Court held that
federal courts should abstain when a case bears upon difficult questions of state policy
which are more important than the immediate issue at bar. State courts are better able to
work out questions of state policy. Under this doctrine, federal courts may dismiss the case
entirely. Harris, supra note 75, at 9.
78. For cases granting abstention, see Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621
F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1980); Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 50 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978); Mus-

kegon Theatres, Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1974); Fralin and Waldron,
Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974); Hill v. City of El Paso, 437 F.2d

352 (5th Cir. 1971); Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D.Md. 1978);
Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 71 F.R.D. 573 (S.D. Cal. 1976);
Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 390 F. Supp. 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
Other federal courts refuse to apply the abstention doctrine in land use cases. See Hotel
Coamo Springs, Inc. v. Col6n, 426 F. Supp. 664 (D.P.R. 1976); Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976) (no state question presented); M. J. Brock
& Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Rasmussen v. City of Lake
Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. IMI.1975); Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Maryland-National Capital
Park and Planning Comm'n, 398 F. Supp. 21 (D. Md. 1975); Lerner v. Town of Islip, 272 F.
Supp. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (request for injunctive relief).
79. 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978).
80. Id. at 281.
81. Id. at 282.
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cable state law might render the federal constitutional issue
2

moot.

Abstention cases like Sederquist indicate that some federal
courts follow principles of federalism that give substantial
credence to local policy-making in land use regulation. These cases
reinforce cases like Penn Central,which applied the constitutional
taking doctrine to affirm local land use regulation even when it
placed substaitial restrictions on the private use of land. Taken
together, these cases indicate that the federal courts are not likely
to take jurisdiction when land use litigation raises questions of
state and local policy.

Conclusion
The demand for monetary compensation through the inverse
condemnation remedy in land use taking cases certainly has an intuitive appeal. All constitutions mandate compensation when a
taking of property has occurred. Excessive land use regulation can
be a taking, and when it is a taking the Constitution would seem to
mandate that compensation be paid.
The difficulty with this argument is that it attaches a single
remedy to a constitutional violation which can be overcome with
equally effective relief through an injunction. Nothing in land use
law or the law of remedies necessarily links any one remedy to insupportable harm to property interests. While the remedial hierarchy in private litigation gives preference to monetary relief, this
article has indicated that courts for good reason do not respect this
preference in actions against public entities. They invert it in land
use cases, denying monetary relief altogether in the inverse condemnation cases, and all but reject it in the only significant section
1983 case decided so far.
This rejection of the inverse condemnation claim in land use
litigation does not mean that local governments will remain undisciplined when their land use programs pass constitutional taking
limits. Remedial injunctive relief to property owners stands as an
effective control. Courts can be expected to refine and amplify
their injunctive remedies as they learn the realities of local land
82.

doctrine.

Id. at 280. It is apparent here that the court was applying the Pullman abstention
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use regulation, the demands of the development process, and the
potential reach of their remedial powers.

